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 LEGAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED 
WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF COMMUNITY SERVICE ORDERS IN 
 SOUTHERN AFRICA (With special reference to Transkei) 
Jeff Handmaker ∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Transkei is like many other "Third World" regions.  Most of its Xhosa-speaking 
inhabitants are desperately poor and suffer from all manner of socioeconomic problems; it is 
administered by a government which in the past has often been corrupt and ineffective1.  
Transkei is where the "surplus population" of the ‘old’ South Africa were (in some instances) 
forcibly removed and is a difficult place to live2. 
Poverty in both underdeveloped and developed communities is increasingly seen to be at 
the root of the overwhelming majority of crimes3.  Some say that crime often increases during 
times of decreased economic growth4, while others claim that crime is more prevalent during 
times of rapid economic growth5.  With respect to both views, one can see a vicious cycle, in 
which a developing country’s growth or decline in its economy is almost without exception a 
process of increased hegemony and a widening in the gap between the very rich and the very 
poor, with those in between struggling to make a living. 
In such desperate situations, peoples’ perceptions of what is morally ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
become blurred6.  Some individuals see certain acts not as crimes, but merely as forms of 
"redistribution"7.  Added to this is the devastating effect of South Africa’s largely discredited 
                     
∗ Final Thesis in partial fulfilment for the degree of LL.M., University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 
May 1994. Supervisor: Professor James Read. 
   1 Both these and other unacknowledged facts are based on my personal observations and discussions with those living in 
the region. 
   2 For an in-depth study of life in Transkei from a `grass roots’ perspective, see Julia Segar, `Fruits of Apartheid: 
Experiencing `Independence’ in a Transkeian Village’, Critical Studies in African Anthropology, No.2, Anthropos, 1989. 
   3 David Dewar, `The role of city and local community planning in crime prevention’, 3 SACC/SASK 1979, notes poverty 
as being `the first causal element’ in crime, particularly with what he refers to as the `prevailing high degree of income 
inequality’. 
   4 Marx, although criticised for not having developed a `coherent’ explanation of crime, asserted that in times of recession, 
what he called the `surplus population’ sank into destitution, which then created what he termed `the dangerous classes’, 
who were likely to resort to crime.  Discussed by Stuart Hall and Phil Scraton, `Law, class and control’, Crime and Society, 
Routledge, 1981. 
 
   5 Human Development Report 1990, publication by United Nations Programme for Development noted that `rapid 
socioeconomic change . . . may lead to an increase in crime’. 
   6 Dlamini observes that `sometimes ordinary and non-criminal conduct is criminalised for a variety of purposes’.  A 
`criminal sanction is applied to otherwise ordinary behaviour which evokes no moral condemnation’.  --  Dlamini, `In 
Defence of Ignorance of Law’, SACJ (1989) 2 SAS, p. 14. 
   7 See Paul Harrison, Inside The Third World, 1993, Penguin, especially pages 153-157. 
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criminal justice system, which has failed to have much impact on the country’s crime rate.  A 
large number of offenders are imprisoned and many of them lose their jobs; family ties become 
strained, since the offender is very often the breadwinner.  This often leads to increased poverty 
and a greater incentive to reoffend on release from prison.  Whatever an individual has taken 
from the community in a material sense is rarely, if ever, returned and a return to prison takes 
even more out of the community through increased public spending on the prison service. 
Deep concern over both poverty and the escalating crime rate have led a number of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) based in Transkei to consider proposals which would tackle 
both.  One suggestion has been to introduce community service: suspended sentences conditional 
on the successful completion of public service within the community.  Transkei has never had 
such a programme despite the potential benefits and the fact that the law already makes provision 
for it8. 
The repressive culture of imposing harsh sentences and building bigger and stronger 
prisons merely creates more space for the increasing number of inmates, and results only in 
greater recidivism.  The community is hardly protected, and the criminal rarely deterred9.  
Community service as a penal option could prove very effective in both addressing the poverty 
and the recidivism of offenders and freeing public funds which could be better used elsewhere. 
However, the benefits of community service could be seen as being much wider than just 
to the individual offender and State budget.  With many ‘development’ organisations facing a 
similar problem, namely a lack of resources and ‘manpower’10, and with the current theme of 
development being one of "empowerment" rather than the paternalistic, dependence-creating 
practices of the past, it makes sense to look to the community itself for solutions11. 
 
A common criticism by and of criminologists is that they lack practical methods through 
which to implement their ideas.  In view of this, what options are available in a region such as 
the Transkei?  Why have past approaches to dealing with offenders proved unsuccesful?  Is 
community service an option compatible with indigenous traditions, and specifically customary 
legal systems, or is it just another unsuitable western invention?  If community service is to be 
adopted, what must be contained in such a programme for it to be viable?  And finally, how will 
                     
   8 s.303 of Criminal Procedure Act 1983 (Act 13 of 1983) 
   9 See R. Graser, op cit. fn 131 
   10 Development in Action: Transkei Model, Bureau of Development Research & Training, Univ. of Transkei, 1990, p.36 
   11 L. Patel, Restructuring Social Welfare, Ravan Press, 1992, also argues for such an approach. 
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the community respond to the prospect of offenders being released into the community?  The 
answers to these questions are complex, particularly if considered, as they must be, in the context 
of underdeveloped South Africa. 
In the opinion of a South African social scientist working with street children in the 
Transkei region, the answer to these questions broadly lies in the willingness of people to accept 
what he calls ‘a paradigmatic shift from retributive to restorative justice’12.  After placing the 
issue in context by providing some background information on the Transkei, this paper will 
attempt to explain how past strategies for punishing criminals were almost exclusively aimed at 
protecting the economy, rather than preventing criminality.  This will be compared to the 
approaches of traditional courts to the issue of punishment, and arguments put forward for the 
incorporation of certain cusomary legal principles.  It will then explain what is meant by 
community service and illustrate how the South African (and recently the Transkei) courts have 
dealt with the issue.  The relevance of judicial and community attitudes to the sentencing of 
offenders will also be considered.  Finally, this paper will conclude by proposing how 
community service can effectively "reverse" the unsuccesful and repressive penological 
approaches of the past, generating social and economic development through legal reform. 
Whatever a person’s position is on the justification of more ‘restorative’ penal 
approaches to tackling crime, they must ultimately appreciate that society cannot hope to tackle 
crime without also focusing attention on the elimination of poverty.  Conversely, one cannot 
expect to eliminate poverty without also looking towards decreasing the crime rate.  By tackling 
these problems simultaneously through a well-structured programme of community service one 
is economically and socially in a stronger position to do both. 
 
I. BACKGROUND – THE TRANSKEI13 
The history of Transkei is one of the more shameful examples of “euro-imperialism”, if 
only because it has lasted so long14.  With the spread of the “New Enlightenment” ideology 
throughout Europe (and later the colonial territories), the British abolitionists secured the 
abolition of slavery, only to see labour laws and ‘employment contracts’ in its place15.  This form 
                     
   12 Jacques De Wet, director of the Umtata Street Child Programme, in his (unpublished) research proposal (1993). 
   13 Any uncorroborated facts are based on personal conversations and/or observations. 
   14 For an interesting, if conservative, account of the history of Transkei, see Beyond the Cape Frontier, eds. C. Saunders 
and Robin Derricourt, Longman, 1974. 
   15 F. Cooper, ‘Contracts, crime, and agrarian conflit: from slave to wage labor on the East African coast’, Labour, Law 
and Crime: An Historical Perspective, eds. Snyder and Hay, Tavistock, 1979, pp. 2280259 
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of waged labour was also introduced in South Africa16.  It was the basis of a fundamentally 
unjust and repressive society which criminalised what had previously been traditional practices 
and fostered a tremendous amount of discontent amongst the indigenous peoples, denied what 
had for centuries been their way of life. 
 
A. Politics and Political Institutions 
 Originally under the jurisdiction of the Cape Province in accordance with the Cape Acts17 
(and later the 1913 Native Lands Act), the Transkei was re-established in 1976 as a nominally 
‘independent homeland’, recognised only by South Africa18.  It has been unique among the 
‘homelands’ as being relatively peaceful, with the former head of the region, General Holomisa, 
having been a sympathiser with the ANC, though tolerant of other political activity in the 
region19. 
 Following the enactment of the 1993 constitution and recent election, the authority 
formerly exercised by the Transkei government has been passed on to the National Parliament, 
with certain powers devolved to the Eastern Cape regional legislature.  The regional legislature 
has certain powers of veto over national legislation, which could prove to be problematic in the 
area of law reform20, vitally important under the ANC government’s plans of redistribution. 
 
B. Law and Legal Institutions 
 The laws enacted by Transkei throughout its brief period of “independence” were 
virtually identical to South Africa’s.  Decisions of the Supreme Court of Transkei have 
occasionally been report4ed in the South African Law Reports and appeals have been allowed 
(though rarely taken) to South Africa’s appellate division. 
 Transkei is divided up into separate magisterial districts, with a Regional Magistrate and 
various subordinate magistrates in each one.  Tribal courts also operate alongside the magistrates 
courts, with similar jurisdiction.  Appeals can be made first to the Regional Magistrate, then to 
the Supreme Court and finally to the national (South African) appeal court in Bloemfontein.  
Magistrates, especially those in rural areas, have very little knowledge of the law or procedure 
                     
   16 Alan Rycroft, ‘Criminal Sanctions and Labour Relations’, SACJ (1989) 2 SAS, p. 272 
   17 Act 38 of 1877.  For more on the British governance of ‘Native’ territories (including Transkei), see G. Dold and C. 
Joubert, The British Commonwealth, Vol. 5 (The Union of South Africa), Stevens and Sons, 1955, pp. 197-244 
   18 Status of the Transkei Act 1976, see 15 ILM 1175. 
   19  For further reading see R. Southall, ‘Rethinking Transkei Politics’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol 11, 
No 2 (2991) pp. 1-30 
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and are inadequately supervised.  Tribal magistrates are said to be notorious for their particularly 
harsh sentences. 
 Bail is in most cases outside the financial reach of defendants and so they are usually 
detained until the case goes to trial.  The problem is compounded by long trial delays, in some 
cases lasting up to 3 years.  With few able to pay fines, the court almost inevitably sentences 
offenders to corporal punishment or to a term of imprisonment. 
 
C. Legal Services 
 There are only a handful of attorneys working in Transkei, and even fewer advocates.  
Those few who don’t handle company matters struggle with heavy caseloads and are 
increasingly reluctant to represent clients pro bono.  Since lawyers of sufficient means often try 
to find work in the more developed parts of South Africa, the overall quality of legal expertise in 
the region is limited.  Legal Aid is virtually non-existent.  There are a couple of under-resourced 
NGOs offering legal advice21, but they are incapable of adequately servicing the Region. 
 Consequently, defendants who find themselves before a Transkei criminal court, often 
there for relatively minor offences involving dishonesty (minor fraud, theft) or non-payment of 
fine, are rarely represented.  Based on their experiences, NGOs report that over 90% of 
defendants have no legal representation at any stage of the proceedings and are often unaware 
that they have a right to defend themselves in court. 
 
D. Prison System 
 The conditions of Transkeian prisons are terrible22.  There are no beds, only blankets 
(often infested with lice) and inadequate medical treatment.  Assaults are common, juveniles 
share cells with adult prisoners23 and communication with the outside world is often limited to 
one visit and two letters a month.  Families travel long distances, only to discover that the prison 
authorities refuse to let them in.  By far the biggest problem is overcrowding, with facilities 
holding far beyond their official maximum capacity.  Rehabilitative programmes are limited. 
 
                                                                
   20  Due to political disagreement. 
   21  Lawyers for Human Rights was the largest with a staff of 5 lawyers (only one who was fully qualified) and 7 support 
staff.  There was also a para-legal project which offered legal advice to the more rural districts. 
   22   Africa Watch, the regional section of US-based NGO Human Rights Watch, included a section specifically on the 
conditions of South African prisons in the Human Rights Watch Global Report on Prisons in 1993. 
   23  Exposing them to potential physical and sexual abuse. 
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E. Facilities and Infrastructure 
 Over 3 million people live in the region24, some in the small city of Umtata, but the 
majority in the rural areas.  As with most ‘Third World’ countries, Transkei suffers from poor 
roads25, inadequate transport26 (minibus taxis and infrequent buses – many people hitch), under-
resourced medical facilities27 and an under-funded educational system28.  There is one university 
in Transkei and 17 technical schools29, but few receive a place; those that do discover large 
classes, poor facilities and a faculty struggling with over-stretched funds.  Students who can 
afford to, attend universities in other parts of South Africa.  Housing is inadequate and a large 
number of people live in slum-like conditions in Umtata’s Ngangelizwe township.  Rural people 
live in similar conditions, with no running water, electricity, etc.  Finally, a lack of social 
facilities means that people largely depend on shebeens (illegal drinking houses) for their 
entertainment.  Not surprisingly, alcoholism is a major problem30.  Though the Transkei 
Development Corporation has made some effort to improve the situation, a lot more needs to be 
done31. 
 The few whites living in Transkei are comparatively well-off, many living in high 
security compounds with few non-white neighbours.  They are disliked by some Transkeians32; 
and not surprisingly, for those who are in Transkei for “altruistic” reasons (aid workers, etc.) 
seem equalled in number by those who are there to make a “fast buck”. 
 
                     
   24  The region also has a comparatively high population density of 67.2 persons per km2.  94.9% are concentrated in rural 
areas.  – Source: SWTBVC Country Statistics (1987). 
   25   In 1983, Transkei had 8,998 km of roads, of which only 941 km were paved. – Source SWTBVC Statistics (1987).  
This figure is likely to have increased slightly since then, but personal experience suggests that things have not changed 
much. 
   26  In 1985, there were only 59,666 vehicles (1 per 50 people), including motorcycles, tractors, etc. of which 6,475 were 
government owned in 1985. – Source: SWTBVC Stats. (1987) 
   27   In 1985, Transkei struggled with 32 hospitals (1 per 94,000 people), 1 health centre and 218 clinics, serviced by 248 
doctors, 5,467 nurses and 27 paramedics.  By comparison, South Africa had 701 hospitals (1 per 39,500 people) and 1,563 
health centres, with 20,477 doctors, 91,633 nurses and 20,179 paramedics.  Source: SWTBVC Stats. 
   28  1985 figures reveal that there were 2,923 schools and 17,790 classrooms in Transkei and 19,192 teachers, in contrast to 
South Africa with 17,156 schools and 195,837 teachers.  870,213 pupils attended school in Transkei (4,694,193 in South 
Africa).  Transkei thus had twice as many students per teacher as South Africa.  Source:  SWTBVC Stats.  
   29  1985 figures, which are unchanged, indicate that there is only 1 university.  South Africa has at least 18 universities 
and 212 technical schools.  – Source:  SWTBVC Stats. 
   30  Bradshaw, McGlahsan & Harington, Oesophageal Cancer: Smoking and Drinking in Transkei, Institute of Social and 
Economic Research, Rhodes University, 1983. 
   31  For a discussion on development initiatives in the region, see Development in Action, op cit. Fn 10 
   32   The tensions which exist between white and non-white residents is made abundantly clear with the graffiti that covers 




 Jobs in Transkei are scarce33.  Consequently, many have found work in the ‘informal 
sector’34.  Before the elimination of “influx control”, those who had been lucky to obtain passes35 
to work and live in South Africa did so, often leaving their families behind to work in the mines36 
or in one of the sprawling cities in South Africa.  Transkeians who have found work in the region 
face widespread exploitation (low wages, summary dismissals), mainly because the employers 
know that they can easily get away with it37. 
 It is quite possible that the statistics referred to grossly underestimate the extent of 
underdevelopment in the Transkei region38, but even based on these figures once can see a 
gloomy picture indeed. 
 In the following section, it is suggested that many of Transkei’s present difficulties arose 
out of a combination of rapid industrial growth and oppressive state control, which were the 
cornerstones of the South African government’s polices, up until very recently.  Approaches to 
crime have to a large extent focussed on the State’s control of the market, rather than the causes 
and prevention of crime.  This approach has not only proved to be ineffective in tackling the 
problem, but has exacerbated the region’s considerable socio-economic troubles. 
 
II. SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND PUNISHMENT 
History has shown that the traditional approach to crime and criminals has not reduced 
criminality to any marked degree39. 
Viewing human actions in isolation from their surrounding circumstances is a common 
mistake of economists, lawyers and criminologists.  One cannot adequately explain human 
activity in ignorance of specific, historical experience.  Therefore, an appreciation of the history 
                     
   33  At the time of the 1986 census, unemployment stood at 82.4%, which accounted for ‘transfrontier commuters’ (i.e. 
those working in South Africa), migrant workers and those in the informal sector (scholars, messengers, hawkers, etc.)  It 
excludes the ‘non-economically active’ population (undefined) – Source SWTBVC Country (South Africa and Dependents) 
Statistics (1987). 
   34  The former Transkei government has been hostile to those working in the informal sector, especially pavement 
vendors.  See Nicoli Natrass, Street Trading in the Transkei: A Struggle Against Poverty, Persecution and Prosecution, 
Development Studies Unit, University of Natal, 1984. 
   35  Under the misleadingly titled Bantu (Abolition of Passes and Co-Ordination of Documents) Act (Act 67 of 1952), non-
white South Africans could only work outside Transkei if they obtained a special permit.  The laws have since been 
repealed. 
   36  Rian Malan, My Traitor’s Heart, 1990, Vintage, pp. 236-263 describes in sobering detail the working conditions of a 
South African gold mine. 
   37  The overwhelming majority of clients seen by Lawyers for Human Rights, a legal NGO operating in Umtata, have 
sought advice with regard to labour problems. 
   38  Iraj Abedian, in his 1983 study On the Accuracy of BENSO National Accounts Statistics, Saldru Working Paper No. 
53, argues that statistical figures supplied by the government are inconsistent and incoherent and therefore unreliable. 
  8
of colonial domination, in particular the effects of its ‘social transformation’ is essential to an 
understanding of "real" crime40. 
Early colonial administrators, in some cases the representatives of large corporations such 
as the British South Africa and Dutch East India Companies, saw tremendous prospects in 
Africa, principally in the exploitation of cheap labour and products such as cloves, coconuts and 
later gold41.  Having found most indigenous peoples living a pastoral way of life in rural areas, 
the authorities had to find a way to manipulate or "transform" the population both in order to 
capitalise on the marketing of indigenous products and to harness an efficient labour force.  The 
colonialists’ attempts to do so in South Africa were evidenced by draconian labour and criminal 
laws, largely in accordance with the successive governments’ policy of influx control42. 
In this context, one can compare the experiences of Tanzania and South Africa, in which 
the laws concerning crime and employer/employee relationships had effectively been legal 
instruments of colonial domination.  The particularly coercive means by which a market 
economy was established in both colonial territories has had a devastating effect on the social 
and economic conditions of the indigenous peoples of the area43.  The desire for the 
accumulation of wealth over the colonialists’ regard for humanitarian concerns was especially 
evident in South Africa, where the value of a black person’s life and property were seen as 
negligible in the pursuit of economic growth, to the virtually exclusive benefit of a white 
minority. 
The theory of the ‘transformation’ of societies into social orders which were compatible 
with the vision of a market economy, as expounded by Karl Polanyi44, has proved influential in 
understanding the history of colonial domination.  The reinterpretations of his theory are of 
significant interest in that they not only help us understand the deleterious effects of colonial 
intrusion, but provide explanations for both the present causes of crime and approaches to 
punishment. 
Polanyi wrote in length about the evolution of a ‘market economy’45, the essence of 
                                                                
   39 R. Graser, in Crime and Punishment in South Africa, McGraw Hill, 1975, p. 201 
   40 Francis Snyder and Douglas Hay, `Comparisons in the social history of law: labour and crime’, Labour, Law and 
Crime: An Historical Perspective, eds. Snyder and Hay, Tavistock, 1979, p.1 
   41 See generally, Labour, Law and Crime: An Historical Perspective, op cit. fn 40, esp. Cooper, `Contracts, crime, and 
agrarian conflict: from slave to wage labor on the East African coast’, pp. 228-252 
   42 For further reading, Mark Sher, `From dompas to disc: the legal control of migrant labour’, Crime and Power in South 
Africa, eds. Dennis Davis & Mana Slabbert, publ. David Philip, 1985, pp. 72-89 
   43 For further reading on this see B. Davidson, The Search for Africa, Random House, 1994. 
   44 Karl Polanyi, `The Great Transformation’, Beacon Press, 1944. 
   45 Ibid., p. 57 
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which was dependent on the State’s ability to ‘control the economic system’.  This has been 
made abundantly clear in South Africa, where it has been said that ‘criminal sanctions are linked 
to economic and fiscal forces’46.  By excluding certain persons (specifically non-white persons) 
from the better-paid part of the formal sector, the government was able to fashion an economic 
infrastructure which, though of great benefit to the minority, was extremely oppressive to 
everyone else.  Polanyi criticised the fact that state ‘control (was) . . . ultimately . . . of 
overwhelming consequence to the whole organization of society’47. 
This sort of control formed part of the justification for highly repressive policies, such as 
South Africa’s policy of apartheid, or separate development.  In order to maintain these separate 
economic spheres, the State found itself having to exercise repression and mass-scale 
redistribution of people and land, which it did with impunity. 
The fact that most people in the "marginalised" section of the economy found themselves 
in increasingly desperate financial circumstances while the minority section thrived is a perfect 
testament to Polanyi’s assertion that ‘the emergence of the idea of (a self-regulating market) . . . 
was a complete reversal of the trend of development’48. 
Of course, Polanyi’s theory went in to much greater depth, far beyond the scope of this 
essay, but his description of the market economy resulting in the ‘smashing up of social 
structures in order to extract the element of labour from them’49 are highly persuasive in 
understanding South Africa’s attempts to create such an economy by forcible means. 
Hay and Snyder described what they saw as three, specific historical processes seen to be 
instrumental in the development of a capitalist economy:  the ‘emergence of an industrial 
working class’, ‘social reproduction of the working class’ and ‘discipline or control’50.  It is this 
latter process which is of particular relevance. 
 
 
III. DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL 
Shivji examined the use of penal sanctions in Tanganyika, and the way in which they had 
been used to coerce the population into playing an active part in the colony’s labour force51.  He 
                     
   46 Alan Rycroft, `Criminal Sanctions and Labour Relations’, SACJ (1989) 2 SAS, p. 271. 
   47 Polanyi, Ibid, p. 57. 
   48 Ibid., p. 68 
   49 Ibid, p. 164. 
   50 Snyder and Hay, op cit. fn 40, pp. 20-23. 
   51 Issa Shivji, `Semi Proletarian Labour and the Use of Penal Sanctions in the Labour Law of Colonial Tanganyika’, 
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held that the colonial state carried out a highly interventionist role, and responded to the 
‘problems of discipline and desertion’ by introducing criminal sanctions.  He criticised master 
and servant legislation (remnants of which remain in some western legal systems) and especially 
the colonial administrators’ justification that these laws were ‘in the interests of the servants’52. 
It might be that the prevailing utilitarian ideology, which saw law as a way of effecting 
social change, had a role to play in all this, but such structuralist arguments are questionable, 
given that what the British introduced in East Africa, on the pretext of offering Africans their 
freedom, amounted to little more than a "modified"53 form of slavery. 
Law in South Africa has, throughout its history, been said to have had a ‘directive or 
normative function’54.  Labour and criminal laws in that country have served as coercive tools as 
a means of implementing the successive governments’ policy of ‘separate development’.  
Criminal sanctions have been seen as ‘pivotal features of labour control in South Africa’55.  
Sumner wrote that ‘the penetration of capitalism into . . . weaker countries was made by force, 
not by consent’56.  This is not difficult to accept, given that the criminal justice system in South 
Africa was, at least at one time, quite willing to imprison mass numbers of black offenders for 
several months at a time for contravention of the Pass Laws57 or for defying regulations under 
the Group Areas Act58. 
Rycroft briefly examined South African legislation regulating the relationship between 
employer and employee, and specifically how this was used as a form of ‘labour control’.  He 
remarked upon how the government used law to control the activities of both employers and 
employees, but in the case of employers the acts were in certain instances ‘simply symbolic 
politics’59 with little enforcement of health and safety regulations, etc.  At the same time, the 
government’s provision for the welfare of employees was concessionary, in that they aimed to 
‘cool’ industrial disputes without giving too much power to the trade unions.  Furthermore, the 
State criminalised certain trade union-related activities, using the police and defence forces and 
emergency regulations to enforce employment laws and break up industrial disputes.  Actions 
                                                                
Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment, ed. Colin Sumner, Heinemann, 1982, p.40. 
   52 Ibid., p. 50 
   53 N.B. Workers were paid, though hardly a living wage. 
   54 As posited by C Sumner and emphasized by Rycroft in his article, `Criminal sanctions and labour relations’, Ibid. 
   55 Rycroft, Ibid, p. 273. 
   56 Colin Sumner, `Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment: Beyond Modernisation Theory’, in Crime, Justice and 
Underdevelopment, ed. Sumner, Heinemann, 1982, p. 30. 
   57 Op cit. fn 35.  See also John Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order, Princeton, 1978, pp. 75-77 
   58 Act 36 of 1966.  See also Dugard, Ibid., pp. 79-83 
   59 Rycroft, Ibid, p. 275. 
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such as these were ‘not infrequently justified "in the public interest"‘60. 
Rycroft’s conclusion was that the ‘public interest’ was in fact the ‘employer’s interest’, 
which might lead one to further conclude that the State’s interest was not with the welfare of its 
citizens so much as with the smooth operation of the market.  He criticised the appropriateness of 
criminal sanctions regarded by most of society as ‘morally neutral’ in that they ‘debilitat(ed) the 
moral impact of the criminal conviction and decrease(d) the overall effectiveness of the criminal 
law’61.  His argument is, essentially, the same as Polanyi’s, that workers were ‘subordinated to 
(the market system’s) requirements’62. 
Apartheid in South Africa was only sustainable to such an extravagant extent, for so 
many decades, because it succeeded in marginalising the majority of the population and 
exercised a brutal regime of state control, in order to protect the white-dominated market63.  With 
so many economic and social barriers in place, the majority who still live in abject poverty have 
few opportunities of finding a way out of their desperate circumstances other than through crime. 
 With past approaches to tackling crime having failed, in large part due to the State’s oppresive 
control of the market, it is imperative that new approaches to dealing with offenders be 
developed. 
For the sake of comparison, it is interesting to examine the way in which customary law 
has approached the punishment of offenders. 
 
IV. CUSTOMARY LAW AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS 
The sense of community prevails in this . . . society.  It is the natural and pervasive 
background from which no individual can wholly extricate himself in thought or action.64 
Traditional African legal approaches provide us with some interesting and persuasive 
precedents for the use of more restorative measures in response to criminal offences. 
Much of the research in this subject has focused on "customary law" as it was practised 
under colonial domination.  However, British influence eventually became so entrenched through 
the policy of indirect rule that much "legal sediment" had permeated into traditional practices, 
effectively transforming it into a different body of law altogether.  This is particularly evident in 
                     
   60 Ibid, p. 282. 
   61 Ibid, p. 283. 
   62 Polanyi, op cit., p. 71 
   63  It eventually proved to be quite unsustainable in the end, due to diplomatic and (most importantly) economic pressures 
from the international community. 
   64 J.F. Holleman, Issues in African Law, Mouton & Co., 1974, p.40. 
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Cotran’s examination/codification of customary law as practised in the local courts of Kenya65, 
where sanctions such as the use of imprisonment had become common practice, though they 
were relatively recent developments and a "European import"66. 
As Read remarks, it is ‘not sufficient to compare western notions of punishment with 
those adopted in traditional Africa’67.  He maintains that the ‘man in Clapham’ has little 
relevance to people living in Africa68.  Junod observes that: 
 
Western influence through colonial rule has imposed the western system of combating 
crime, which has notably failed even in western countries.69 
 
Many Transkeians living in urban areas have adopted a largely western orientation, with a 
tendency to identify with European values and practices over more traditional ones.  A similar 
situation exists as in Zambia, where political, legal and social structures which were in place 
before Europeans arrived have been all but ‘wiped out’70.  It is interesting to note that a growing 
number of people are of the view that many of the problems which post-colonial societies 
struggle with today can be traced back to the legacy of colonial rule, the European structures of 
which were ‘transplanted’ and entrenched at independence71. 
Institutions best serve those who created them, especially if one considers the relevance 
of present structures from the point of view of the average citizen.  In light of this, it may be 
desirable to examine pre-colonial approaches to punishment and consider how they connect with 
the notion of community service. 
It is evident from writings which adopt a more "afrocentric" position that pre-colonial 
local courts distinguished differently between what Europeans perceive to be "offences" and 
injuries to a person72.  Although little has been written on customary law’s approach to crime and 
                     
   65 E. Cotran, Report on Customary Criminal Offences in Kenya, (1962). 
   66 Julius Lewin, Studies in African Law, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971, writes that `imprisonment was not a 
form of punishment known to the Africans (but rather) Europeans introduced them to it’, p. 91 
   67 J. Read, `Crime and Punishment in East Africa’ in 1964 Howard Law Journal, Vol 10, p. 164 at 167. 
   68 Ibid., p. 185 
   69 Dr. H P Junod, (1966) East African Law Journal 31 
   70 Mwansa, `The status of African and customary criminal law and justice under the received English criminal law in 
Zambia:  A case for the integration of the two systems’, Z.L. Rev. Vol. 4 1986, p.27, notes that `Missionaries regarded 
African law and customs as mere aspects of paganism which had to be wiped out in order to pave the way for christianity 
and "civilisation"‘. 
   71 See Basil Davidson, The Search for Africa, Random House, 1994 and Ruth Weiss Zimbabwe and The New Elite, 
British Academic Press, 1994. 
   72 I. Schapera, A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom 1938, Oxford University Press, on page 257, describes legal 
wrongs dealt with in Tswana courts as `based primarily upon the nature of the offence committed, i.e. of the right infringed, 
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punishment among the Xhosa (in Transkei), it is evident that much is shared by indigenous legal 
systems throughout Southern Africa.  A common theme among various customary legal systems 
(in Southern Africa and elsewhere) is a deep concern over what law does or ought to do, in 
contrast with European, positivist obsessions over what law is73. 
In Bechuanaland, as Schapera explains, tribal courts were accorded jurisdiction to deal 
with both criminal and civil matters under the Native Tribunals Proclamation (No. 75 of 1934), s. 
8(1).  This jurisdiction extended to all offences except those of a serious nature.  However, 
before the passing of the legislation which, it must be noted, emanated from the British colonial 
adminstration, the indigenous courts exercised jurisdiction over all matters, irrespective of their 
seriousness. 
The punishments imposed by the Tswana tribal courts are of particular interest in that 
they were, generally speaking, far more restorative in nature, in stark contrast to the retributive 
nature of European-style criminal sanctions74.  For example, in cases of bodily assault, the 
tendency of the local courts was to impose a fine, which would then be passed on (in part or in 
full) to the person injured75 as compensation. 
So-called ‘wrongs against property’ were also approached in the theme of restorative 
justice, by compensating the victim rather than simply punishing the offender.  For example, in 
the event of a settlement not being reached on a boundary dispute the matter was referred to the 
Chief, as head of the tribal court.  Following this, the court considered whether or not to "punish" 
the trespasser.  Schapera describes an offender who had encroached on another’s fields as being 
‘ordered to plough another field belonging to the real owner, as compensation for having wasted 
his time by involving him in a dispute when he should have been busy ploughing’.  Naturally, the 
corn produced by this field would belong to the owner of the field76.  Rather than a fine being 
imposed by the State, or in this case the tribal Chief, the court resolved the matter by attempting 
to put things right.  The matter was settled not only by ordering compensation, but the court also 
ordered the offender to perform labour for the benefit of the victim, a most unusual approach as 
                                                                
and does not attempt to distinguish clearly between civil wrongs and criminal offences’ (emphasis added).  Lewin, 
Studies in African Law, op cit. fn 66, p. 89, holds that there `is no clear distinction between criminal and civil law’. 
   73 T.W. Bennett, A Sourcebook of African Customary Law for Southern Africa, Juta, 1991, Chapter 1 
   74 The same can be said of the Sotho, where compensation was the most common approach taken by tribal courts in 
dealing with offfences under Sotho law.  Of this, see Patrick Duncan, Sotho Laws and Customs, O.U.P., 1960, pp. 103-115. 
   75 Schapera, Ibid., p.259.  Schapera explains that `the idea underlying this practice was that all tribesmen belonged to the 
chief, and therefore any bodily injury inflicted upon one of them was a wrong inflicted upon the chief’.  He further 
maintained that in the `olden days’, the law of retailiation was practised (e.g. by ordering the assailant to inflict a similar 
wound on himself with a similar weapon), but that recently the court was more inclined towards compensation, which 
increased comensurate to the nature of the offence. 
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compared to the European practices of the day. 
Damage to property was settled in Tswana courts through the ‘general principle . . . that 
the owner of the property damaged is entitled to restitution or compensation’.  The court also 
considered the offender’s ability to pay.  As with trespass, the tribal courts have ordered 
offenders who cause damage to others’ property (whether intentionally or by accident) to assist 
the victim replace what has been damaged or destroyed77.  Theft was also dealt with by way of 
compensation78. 
Schapera continued to discuss the procedures of Tswana courts, by describing alternative 
bodies which dealt with disputes within the community.  The scope of these bodies was 
‘confined mainly to attempting to provide a peaceful settlement of the dispute’.  Again, the 
emphasis was not one of laying recriminations, but on returning the injured party to the position 
he/she was in before the offence occurred, a restorative approach, as it were, rather than a 
retributive one. 
Similar indigenous approaches to crime have existed in other parts of Africa, as in the 
Sudan79.  Howell (a former colonial administrator) explained that, to the Nuer, ‘the concept of 
punishment was unknown’80.  Stressing the practice among the Nuer of ‘collective 
responsibility’81, that ‘there is rarely an isolated individual wrong or an isolated right’, Howell 
emphasised that it was very much the exception that an individual was simply blamed for his 
misconduct, but instead his standing within the community was altered somewhat.  Sanctions 
were not punitive in the "normal" sense, but amounted to ‘loss of privileges’ which the offender 
had by virtue of his being a member of his community.  The severity of the sanction was 
determined in the context of ‘structural relativity’82, which decreased relative to the ‘closeness’ 
of the relationship between offender and victim83. 
Howell further noted the ‘resistance’ of the Nuer to the State’s attempts to punish 
(especially imprison) a culprit, believing that such matters were best dealt within the 
                                                                
   76 Schapera, Ibid., p. 269. 
   77 Schapera, Ibid., p. 270, where he gives the example of an offender who set fire to another’s hut.  He was ordered "to cut 
new rafters and poles, to provide thatching grass and to pay for the rebuilding of the roof". 
   78 Schapera, Ibid., p. 271.  In cases of theft, `as a general rule . . the owner of the stolen property is entitled to receive 
twice the value of the article stolen’. 
   79 P.P. Howell, A Manual of Nuer Law, O.U.P., 1954. 
   80 Howell, Ibid., p. 2. 
   81 Howell, Ibid., p.23.  This view also expressed by Mqeke, ante. 
   82 Howell, Ibid., p. 24.  Referring primarily to familial relationships. 
   83 Although there is a greater likelihood that the wrong will be rectified. 
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community84.  He accepted that the practices of the Nuer were deeply affected by the British 
courts, pointing to a misunderstanding of (or perhaps contempt for) Nuer ideas of justice85 on the 
part of magistrates.  However, he seemed to suggest that the views of the Nuer prevailed, in spite 
(or perhaps because) of the pervasiveness of indirect rule. 
 
Other discussions of customary law have also stressed the ‘communal element’ which 
had played a major role in deciding disputes between individuals and those involving an 
individual against the community generally.  There is a general theme of the importance of 
harmony within the community86.  When this harmony is broken, the community is unstable and 
efforts must come from all who are a part of the community to restore it.  As one writer put it: 
 
. . . the court is not merely concerned with the question of right or wrong but also with 
the effect of the judgement upon the future relations between the parties, which are so 
vital to the life of the community itself.87 
 
The conflict, he said, belonged to and was to be decided by ‘the community itself’. 
 
These are intriguing concepts when compared to the approach of other legal systems, 
where it is apparent even today that many people’s perceptions of "justice" are shrouded in the 
belief that offenders must be punished, whether in retribution or to serve as examples to others88. 
 The idea that offenders should be rehabilitated is a view not universally popular, even in 
countries such as Britain, where the "culture of retribution" still persists89.  "Modern" British 
society seems more ready to condemn than to forgive, although it is still a country which 
imposes community service as a sentencing option90. 
                     
   84 Howell, Ibid., p. 62. 
   85 Howell, Ibid., p.237. 
   86 Martin Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order, Cambridge University Press, 1985, in his critical analysis of 
customary legal practices which exposed what he saw as many misconceptions of African custom, disagrees, though he does 
maintain that `if harmony is no longer perceived in (indigenous) societies a new view is needed of what the essence of 
"restoring the equilibrium" was’. 
   87 J.F. Holleman, op cit. fn 64, p.3 
   88 Take the recent case of the American teenager who was recently flogged in Singapore as punishment on a conviction 
for vandalism.  Despite calls for clemency from US President Clinton, most Americans were of the view that the sentence 
should be carried out. 
   89 The vengeful attitudes of many Britons towards sentencing offenders were recently made clear in the `Bulger case’ as 
against the 2 children who were found guilty of murder.  There were even suggestions that the two offenders (aged 10 and 
11) should have been hanged. 
   90 In 1992, out of a total of 1.52 million offenders, 44,100 were ordered to perform community service (up from 42,500 
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Chanock is of the view that ‘customary law is not customary’91.  His criticism of the 
‘myth’ that African customary practices were all geared to compromise extended to his firm 
rebuttal of the approach of certain anthropologists, who he said were trying to ‘reassert the pre-
colonial Africanness’.  However, he is intensely critical of British colonialism, holding that 
certain indigenous groups ‘held Europeans responsible for the moral decline’.  On punishment, 
he partly concludes by stating that, 
 
British oppression was contained partly within the legalism of its legal system and also 
partly in the failure of the system to live up to its promises92. 
 
He even refers to a form of community service, imposed by the Native Authorities in Nyasaland 
in 193793, which he notes as ‘the element of a different practice surviving’94. 
Chanock’s observations on the nature of customary law fit well with the belief of many, 
including Mqeke (supra), that customary law is not static, but intended to be ever-changing.  
However, customary law has not been allowed to evolve due to the practice of colonial courts to 
invoke the ‘repugnancy test’ whenever there was a conflict between customary practice and the 
common law.  Bennett observes that, in Transkei, customary law was recognised by the courts 
provided it was ‘compatible with the principles of humanity observed throughout the civilized 
world’95.  In practice, the courts may have chosen to ignore the customs altogether.  In any case it 
seems that customary laws were never really ‘tested’ in the courts and thus remain largely 
undeveloped, certainly in a formal sense. 
Speaking of Transkei, Mqeke asserts that ‘law is or sought(sic) to be a cultural reflection 
of the people it is intended to serve’96.  He points to customary law as being ‘group orientated’ 
and that a ‘breach of rules in one set of activity (causes) disturbance in a wide range of (other) 
activities’.  If this is true, then it seems logical to assume that Mqeke would support the argument 
                                                                
the previous year)  Criminal Statistics: England and Wales, HMSO, 1992 
   91 Martin Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order, op cit. fn 86, p. 4 
   92 Ibid. p. 134 
   93 Malawi has, and still does, operate a programme of extra-mural penal employment very similar to the scheme that 
existed in Tanganyika (Supra, pp. 37-38) through the Convicted Persons (Employment on Public Work) Act, 1954 and 
Rules (Cap. 9:03) 
   94 Chanock, Ibid., p. 119 
   95 Bennett, The Application of Customary Law in Southern Africa, reprinted in Bennett, op cit. fn 73, p. 112 
   96 R.B. Mqeke, `Traditionalism in Modern African Legal Systems with Specific Reference to the Legal Position in 
Southern Africa’, Transkei Law Journal 1988, p.2.  This was in response to a comment made by an Afrikaans professor that 
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in favour of community service in that it addresses the ‘disturbance’ in the community and is 
more in line with ‘group orientation’ (i.e.  sentencing persons back into the community rather 
than cells). 
Mqeke speaks in favour of the ‘export (of) some of the basic notions of indigenous law 
such as the principle of reconciliation or consensus, social solidarity, flexibility, etc.’  He also 
claims that what is needed is to bring customary law in to parity with the colonial system, with 
equal application to every person, irrespective of their background97. 
Koyana also sees law in the Transkei as ‘a reflection of the way in which people live’ and 
suggests a direct correlation between customary practice and legitimate98 law, provided it is 
‘long established’, ‘reasonable’, ‘uniformly observed’ and ‘certain’99.  Seeing, as Howell100 did, 
a degree of ‘conscious adjustment’ in customary law which arose out of resistance to colonial 
domination, Koyana does not see this as in any way preventing customary law from being 
accepted by the community. 
Koyana concludes by calling for a ‘macro-jurisprudential approach’ to law reform which, 
he says, ‘implies full understanding of the phenomenon of law as normative rule, sociological 
fact and ethical ideal’101.  Appreciating the "organic" nature of customary law, he nevertheless is 
of the view that it should to some extent be codified, so as to avoid its ‘extinction’102. 
In agreement with Mqeke and Koyana, it is evident that a fundamental re-examination of 
Transkei’s legal system needs to take place.  In light of these customary laws, one can see a 
strong tendency, in dealing with offenders, towards an approach to sentencing based more on 
restoration rather than punishment.  This approach, also being central to the philosophy behind 
community service, is one which is vitally needed in the Transkei region. 
Given the immense confusion and overlap of both traditional practices and the "legacy" 
of colonial rule, which has so deeply pervaded much of African society, it is unlikely that 
community sentencing will achieve immediate, universal acceptance.  It will take some time, 
though arguably less than some might expect103, before people appreciate the benefits of keeping 
                                                                
to revive customary law was a waste of time since it was, in his opinion, dying out. 
   97 For further discussion on the integration of customary law into European-based legal systems, see Mwansa, Z.L. Rev. 
Vol. 4 1986, p.23 
   98 In the sense that it is respected by Transkeians. 
   99 Digby Sqhelo Koyana, Customary Law in a Changing Society, Juta & Co., 1980, p. 91. 
   100 See supra. 
   101 Koyana, Ibid., p. 156 
   102 Ibid., p. 158. 
   103 Mwansa, op cit. fn 70, reports that `the vast majority of Zambians do not believe that imprisonment is the best way to 
control crime (and that many Zambians) viewed (that) an increase in employment opportunities was the best method’ (for 
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people out of prison.  Indeed some crimes are so horrific that protection of (and from) the 
community (custody) will be seen as the only option. 
In short, it would be difficult completely to dismiss European concepts of punishment, 
which might in certain instances conflict with customary law, simply because they are not 
indigenous to the Transkei.  The "westernization" of much of Transkei’s urban society is such 
that to completely ignore European approaches to punishment would be denying many citizens 
what they now perceive to be fundamental.  However, there is significant scope and precedent 
for the "re-establishment" (or at least equal application) of certain customary legal principles, 
specifically those aimed at reconciliation, restitution and compensation, principles also shared by 
community service. 
 
V. THE "CONCEPT" OF COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Many misconceptions surround the philosophy behind community service, including the 
belief that it is a "soft option".  Whether one is of the view that what is needed is ‘a little less 
understanding and a little more condemning’104 or of the belief that ‘when a person does wrong 
the aim should be to rehabilitate that person’105, they are likely to let their emotions dominate 
their sensibilities, and therefore pre-determine their approach to community service.  It is 
therefore important to illustrate briefly the theory behind community service orders, as practised 
in England and broadly replicated in South Africa. 
Whereas community service in South Africa is a direct alternative to a custodial sentence, 
or rather one of a number of possible conditions to a suspended sentence, in England it is a 
sentence in its own right, though some believe that the offender should be made aware of the 
sentence to which community service is an alternative106. 
Community service was introduced in England and Wales by the Powers of Criminal 
Courts Act 1973, ss. 14-17 (as amended by s.10 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991) in response to 
recommendations of the 1970 Wootton Committee.  It is a sentence which can be imposed on 
offenders aged 16 and over, for a period ranging from 40 to 240 hours (120 for 16 year olds)107. 
                                                                
attacking property crime). 
   104 This has been a popular `catch-phrase’ of the conservative government in the UK, in line with its rigid policy of law 
and order, though it contrasts sharply with certain policy papers, notably the 1990 White Paper, `Crime, Justice and 
Protecting the Public’. 
   105 Mr R M Matatu, member of the Transkei Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 6th Session of the 2nd National Assembly, 
11 June 1984. 
   106 Ken Pease, Community Service Orders: A First Decade of Promise, Howard League for Penal Reform, 1981, pp. 23-25 
   107 Harding and Koffman, Sentencing and The Penal System, Sweet & Maxwell, 1988, p.213 
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Community service is very much "welfare-based", in that responsibility for the 
programme falls under the Department of Health and Social Services in conjunction with the 
National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO), a non-governmental 
agency. 
 
The government sees two main objectives of a CSO, namely reintegration of the offender 
into the community through: 
 
1) positive and demanding unpaid work, keeping to disciplined requirements;  and 
 
2) reparation to the community by undertaking socially useful work which, if 
possible, makes good damage done by offending.108 
There should not be any discrimination on grounds of race or sex, and enforcement of this 
is the responsibility of the Secretary of State109.  The relevance of the seriousness of the offence, 
as well as the offender’s previous convictions, largely depends on the discretion of the courts.  
Pre-sentence reports are invaluable in the determination of a particular offender’s suitability for a 
CSO, and his consent to the imposition of the CSO is required by s.2(3) of the PCCA 1973. 
Whereas the case law on community service in England has greatly developed since its 
initial introduction in 1973110, in South Africa the courts have yet to develop a broad 
jurisprudence which covers many of the outstanding issues connected with community service 
orders.  However, the guidelines enumerated by Mr. Justice Pickering in the Transkei case of S 
v. Sikunyana111 will hopefully be of significant use to sentencers in developing the use of CSOs. 
 
Having examined what community service is (at least in theory), it is also necessary to 
consider what community service is not.  There have been several examples of "community 
based" penalties in African countries which, though achieving the aim of diverting offenders 
away from prison, have other, undesirable aspects as well. 
The British in Tanganyika introduced a programme of Extra-Mural Penal Labour in 1933, 
                     
   108 `National Standards for the Supervision of Offenders in the Community’, issued by the Secretary of State under the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991. 
   109 s.95, CJA 1991 
   110 For a comprehensive, recent and well presented survey of the law and practice surrounding community sentences in 
the UK, see Richard Ward and Sarah Ward, Community Sentences: Law and Practice, Blackstone Press, 1993. 
   111 Op cit. fn 121 
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which was effectively prison labour without incarceration.  Based on a similar programme 
introduced by the British authorities in Palestine, it ‘played a vital part in preventing even greater 
overcrowding in prisons’112.  Eligibility was limited to those who would otherwise have been 
sentenced to imprisonment of 6 months or less or a fine of 1,000 shillings or less.  The choice 
was the offender’s, provided he had not been barred by the magistrate.  The programme was 
fairly succesful.  For example, in 1961, only 764 offenders ‘failed to co-operate and were sent 
back to prison’, out of a total of 15,569 offenders that year113. 
However, the work which was carried out was largely in the State’s, rather than the local 
community’s interests and there was no ‘link’ between the nature of the work and the crime 
committed114.  Eligibility was limited to those offenders who would otherwise have received a 
short prison sentence or small fine, thus excluding a large number of offenders who might 
otherwise benefit.  What was desirable about the programme was that it not only kept the 
offender out of prison, but required his consent, which undoubtedly played a large part in its 
relative success. 
Swaziland recently introduced a programme of Extra-Mural Penal Employment (EPE)115. 
 Largely under the remit of the prison service which refers offenders to the scheme (though 
magistrates also have the power to refer), it involves placing the offenders in unpaid 
employment, with 40 hours of work per week equivalent to a week in prison.  Like the 
programme in Tanganyika, it is an alternative way of dispensing with a prison sentence.  The 
success of the scheme has been measured by not only the money saved, but that approximately a 
third of those taking part in the scheme obtained full-time employment as a result of their 
placement.  Some evidence even suggests that some offenders have been ‘decriminalised’ by the 
experience. 
But as with EPE in Tanganyika, the work carried out doesn’t appear to be directly in the 
interests of the local community.  The Swaziland programme involves work in businesses as well 
as State agencies, which would seem to bear little relation to the crime committed. 
The community service programme ultimately introduced certainly must not amount to 
the sort of prison labour which was practised in South Africa during the era of apartheid, where 
                     
   112 J. Read, `Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda’ in African Penal Systems, ed. Alan Milner, Routledge, 1968, pp. 148-152 
   113 Ibid., p. 149 
   114 Discussed in more detail in the following section. 
   115 Information based on a report of the 1989 Conference on penal reform, organised by Penal Reform International 
(reference unknown). 
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prisoners were ‘subordinated to the aims of making a profit’116.  In addition to the matters 
considered in the following section, the work done should largely be voluntary, though there has 
been a suggestion that there be ‘some form of remuneration’117, which might form part of a trust 
fund, for the benefit of the victims or to help support the offender’s family. 
 
VI. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY SERVICE 
 
It is indeed a mark of civilization that nations seek to prevent crime and reform 
offenders.118 
 
The Criminal Procedure Act, 1983 (Transkei Act 13 of 1983), s.303(1)(a)(i)(cc) [South 
Africa Act 51 of 1977, s.297] provides as follows: 
 
Where a court convicts a person of any offence, other than an offence in respect of which 
any law prescribes a minimum punishment, the court may in its discretion - postpone for 
a period not exceeding five years the passing of sentence and release the person 
concerned - on one or more conditions, whether as to - (compensation, rendering to the 
victim of some specific benefit/service, good conduct, etc. or). . . the rendering of some 
service for the benefit of the community (my emphasis). 
 
Community service in South Africa and Transkei is not a sentence on its own; it is a 
condition which may be attached to a suspended sentence and therefore a direct alternative to a 
custodial sentence.  The significance of this becomes apparent when one considers the 
underlying philosophy behind the imposition of a Community Service Order (CSO). 
If a prison sentence is generally seen to reflect the severity of the crime committed, then 
the CSO must, as the cliche goes, be punishment that fits the crime.  Put another way, ‘the 
difficulty (of the sentencer) is whether to find some link between the service that has to be 
performed and the crime or offence that was committed’119.  This quote by a magistrate in 
Durban highlights the problems sentencers face when deciding whether or not a CSO order is 
                     
   116 T M Corry, Prison Labour in South Africa, NICRO, 1977 
   117 See supra `Judicial and Community Attitudes to Sentencing’ 
   118 William Clifford, An Introduction to African Criminology, Oxford University Press, 1974, p. xi 
   119 T.D. Reid, `Community Service as an Alternative to Imprisonment: A Judicial Perspective’, 8 SACC/SASK 1984, 
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appropriate.  He cites the example of a person convicted of reckless driving, where voluntary 
work helping to provide first aid to crash victims would be appropriate, but that ‘in other cases, 
the link may be very remote or non-existent and it is not any easy matter to decide whether a 
sentence of community service is justified at all’120. 
The importance of his emphasis on ‘link’ cannot be overstated.  Sentences cannot simply 
be arbitrarily "plucked from the air", as certain magistrates and judges seem wont to do.  
Although sentencers are endowed with a great degree of latitude as to which sentence they 
ultimate decide to impose on an offender, it is imperative that society demand a certain degree of 
justification (i.e. judicial reasoning), particularly in the case of community sentencing where a 
convicted offender is to be "released" into society.  It is also extremely important that the 
offender be made to realise the consequences of his actions. 
The landmark case of S v. Sikunyana121, heard in the Supreme Court of Transkei in 1993, 
was the first of its kind in the former ‘homeland’ (and the rest of South Africa for that matter) 
seriously to address the issues which a magistrate should consider in deciding whether or not to 
impose a sentence of community service.  Mr Justice Pickering, while commending the 
magistrate for his initiative in ordering community service, was concerned at ‘the manner in 
which he approached the whole issue’122 of the imposition of the CSO. 
Pickering, J. urged that, in future, magistrates take an approach of ‘clarity and precision’ 
and undertake ‘a proper investigation into all relevant issues’.  He then went on to lay out a 
number of guidelines which had been in use by magistrates in Capetown and were endorsed by 
the South African Attorney-General.  Although he stressed that they were not drafted by him, but 
by NICRO123, no Transkei judge before him gave them any consideration.  He also emphasized 
that the guidelines were merely for the purposes of guidance to magistrates and a certain degree 
of flexibility was expected on the part of the sentencer.  In other words, they are not to be seen as 
‘immutable’124. 
 
The guidelines (as amended by Pickering, J.) are as follows: 
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   120 Ibid, p.129. 
   121 The State v. Sikunyana, 1994 (1) SACR 206 (Tk), Supreme Court of Transkei, Review Judgement. 
   122 Ibid., p. 209. 
   123 National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Rehabilitation of Offenders. 
   124 Sikunyana, Ibid., p.215 
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(1) Minimum age of 15 years 
It is difficult to see any reason why a person younger than 15 years should prima facie not 
be subject to a community service order.  If seen, as it should be, not only as a penal measure but 
also as a welfare initiative, then it seems a good idea that younger persons who find themselves 
in trouble with the law be dealt with at an early stage.  Some believe that preventing criminal 
tendencies is easier with younger offenders125. 
Whether or not a young offender is suitable for community service will obviously depend 
on a number of factors, but in some instances it may be found that the trouble a young offender is 
in hides a deeper problem126.  Taking a "welfare approach", therefore, is in any case bound to be 
desirable. 
 
(2) The accused must be employed and have a permanent residence. 
In the matter of employment, Pickering, J. doubted both its relevance and necessity, 
recognising the high rate of unemployment in the region.  As for the requirement that an accused 
have a permanent residence, it is clear that this is intended as a safeguard to ensure compliance 
with the order, in the same way in which such a condition is attached to an order releasing an 
offender on bail.  As desirable a provision as it may be, given that the housing situation in South 
Africa, and particularly Transkei, is woefully inadequate, it is difficult to imagine a CSO being 




(3) An employed accused is to perform a maximum of 16 hours of community 
service per week. An unemployed accused is to have no weekly limit. 
Community service, to the extent that it is aimed to be rehabilitative, is not intended to 
put people out of work, and therefore if a person is employed at the time of his conviction, it 
would be foolish to jeopardise his employment which could put him in a position where he 
would be tempted to reoffend.  It should therefore be seen as ideal that a CSO is carried out 
during a person’s "leisure time".  In this respect, it is also a justifiable criminal sanction on a 
person’s liberty, which gives the CSO its punitive edge.  With an accused who is unemployed, as 
                     
   125 Clifford, Introduction to African Criminology, op cit. fn 118, pp. 162-180 advocates this approach. 
   126 Ibid., p. 169 
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is often the case127, there are no such concerns. 
 
(4) Community service should range between 60 and 300 hours. 
This maximum limit seems reasonable on the face of it, in that it is broadly in line with 
South African and British community service programmes128.  However, if Transkei were to 
adopt a programme similar to Extra-Mural Penal Employment, as operated in Swaziland129, in 
which the length of such an order is equal to that which the offender would have spent in prison, 
this point could prove to be problematic. 
   
(5) Community service should be completed within one year. 
The idea that a CSO should be carried out within a year is possibly in part meant to 
ensure that an offender is not subjected to unreasonably lengthy servitude, at the mercy of the 
State130.  Growing opinion that the benefits of custodial sentencing are reduced the longer a 
person spends in prison131 might equally apply to a CSO.  The same "hard man" mentality that is 
developed by long-term prisoners could conceivably be acquired by those carrying out long 
sentences of community service.  People eventually, albeit reluctantly, grow accustomed to 
something they despise if they spend a long time doing it, which renders worthless any penal 
measure meant to rehabilitate. 
 
(6) Persons convicted of virtually any kind of offence can be sentenced to 
community service, but persons with aggressive tendencies, alcoholics, drug 
addicts, mentally disturbed persons and sexual offenders are not suitable 
candidates. 
Pickering, J. referred to the South African cases of S v. Russouw132, in which it was held 
that a CSO was inappropriate for an offender who had a propensity to resort to dishonesty when 
                     
   127 Pickering, J. makes note of Transkei’s high rate of unemployment on p. 214, Ibid. 
   128 CSOs in England and Wales are between 40 and 240 hrs. 
   129 See supra. 
   130 In other words, one should avoid the sort of `penal labour’ which has been practised in the past.  For more on this, see 
generally, T.M. Corry, op cit. fn 118 
   131 R. Graser, `The Pre-Sentence Investigation as an Aid to Rational Sentencing’, Crime and Punishment in South Africa, 
McGraw Hill Publishers, 1975, p. 201, notes that `there is little, if any, scientific evidence that severe sentences or the 
anticipation of these effectively deters actual or potential law-breakers’.  `In fact’, he says, `it is obvious that imprisonment 
has a detrimental effect on the offender and his family and, through its negative consequences, to society itself.’  In England, 
similar views of many senior advocates and judges are expressed. 
   132 1991 (1) SACR 561. 
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faced with a crisis; and S v. Louw133, which held that community service was appropriate for a 
second offender whose first conviction was for a dissimilar offence in respect of which he was 
not sentenced to a term of imprisonment.  It is evident from these two cases and others that 
jurisprudence on community service has not developed to the point where it adequately clarifies 
whether or not an offender will be suitable for a CSO. 
Cases such as Russouw tend to undermine the credibility of community service as a 
sentencing option without offering a great deal of justification.  Indeed in Russouw, Berman, J. 
held that community service ‘should be reserved for deserving or "special" cases’, referring to 
the offender’s conduct in the case as ‘a character defect which renders him prone to criminality’. 
 The judge was apparently keen to address the issue of retribution, for which a CSO, in his 
opinion, would not do, though he still insisted that community service was a valuable penal 
measure. 
It is difficult to understand why the judge in question, who was as enthusiastic about 
community service as he appeared to be134, did not simply alter the terms of the CSO rather than 
the sentence itself.  The case was unusual in that the accused, charged with fraud, was of 
substantial enough means whereby his creditors were likely to be reimbursed, especially since 
the accused’s employer still valued his services, despite his conduct.  There was also probably a 
certain degree of public expectation that Russouw be suitably punished.  But the case is atypical 
of most offences which come before the courts and few offenders will have the earning capacity 
of Mr. Russouw.  It is hoped that this case will not be used to prevent the imposition of a CSO 
upon an accused of more modest means who, despite a propensity for dishonesty, might be no 
less prone to criminality after a term of imprisonment than if his sentence were suspended135.  
The case of Louw, where the accused’s previous conviction did not render community service 
unsuitable, in a sense confirms this though it was decided six years before Russouw.  Further 
cases which deal with the matter of suitability will be dealt with later. 
Community service would clearly be unsuitable for many dangerous offenders, against 
whom society is entitled to a certain degree of protection.  But the criminal justice system is 
unlikely to protect society by routinely punishing offenders with a term of imprisonment.  
                     
   133 1986 (2) SA 236. 
   134 Referring to community service as `a most valuable weapon in the armoury for fighting crime’, p. 564, Ibid. 
   135 It arguably far more common for retribution to be exercised against those who have less.  Russouw himself had been 
found guilty on at least one previous occasion of a dishonesty offence, for which he received merely a suspended sentence! 
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Penological approaches which depend solely on punishment lack a ‘rational basis’136 and 
ultimately do little to protect society when the offender is in most cases eventually going to be 
released. 
The advantage of community service is that it can be specifically designed for individual 
offenders and relate far more closely to the particular circumstances of their crime.  This 
"individualising" of sentences is the rehabilitative aspect of community service and an integral 
part of ‘the link’137. 
Certainly it is difficult (if not impossible) to say with any certainty whether a given CSO 
option will rehabilitate those convicted of a certain kind of crime, but it would be rash to dismiss 
the possibility of rehabilitation in all cases and automatically sentence offenders to a term of 
imprisonment, or to pay a fine (which, it has already been mentioned, they are unlikely to be in a 
position to afford).  If there is scope for alternative sanctions then one should always opt to keep 
a person out of custody.  Ultimately, the idea is to avoid the "knee jerk" response which holds 
that "those who break the law should be locked up".  As understandable as such feelings are, they 
are still irrational138 and must be seen as such, not only by the general public, but by the 
sentencer. 
 
(7) Community service should not be used if the offence is so serious that non-
custodial punishment would bring the system of criminal justice into 
discredit in the community. 
 
This guideline is undeniably an important one, but it might be measured against the views 
of the many people who suffer under South Africa’s burgeoning crime rate that the present 
system has completely failed them.  The guideline by NICRO stated that ‘convicted persons who 
would otherwise have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months do not 
qualify’.  But Pickering, J., agreeing with the decision in S v. Abrahams (discussed in more detail 
later), disagreed that CSOs should exclude those who have committed more serious offences.  
The South African community must be made to understand that a CSO is not a "soft option", but 
is indeed punitive.  Those who manage such a programme should make this "community 
education" aspect as vital a part of their agenda as the content of service itself. 
                     
   136 Rabie and Strauss, Punishment, Lex Patria, 1979, p.7 
   137 See supra. 
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(8) Persons who are socially isolated, purposeless and who have not yet had the 
opportunity to make a positive contribution to society are regarded as being 
suitable for community service (emphasis added). 
This is an important provision, for it gives magistrates specific examples of what to look 
for in deciding whether or not an accused is a suitable candidate for a CSO.  The characteristics 
mentioned in the guideline are shared by many offenders who would otherwise be incarcerated, 
to their further detriment.  It includes many young offenders (especially those who have not been 
able to secure jobs) and those individuals (young and old) who have been unable to get anywhere 
in life, for whatever reason, and (as suggested in the introduction) eventually saw crime as the 
only viable alternative139.  In short, it implies a "welfare approach". 
 
(9) The court must be satisfied that the accused is acceptable to those to whom 
he is allotted and that he can be of use there and not be a burden. 
 
(10) He must be acceptable to those entrusted to his care.  If he is rendering a 
service to the aged, children or the disabled they should not mistrust or fear 
him. 
 
(11) It is desirable that the accused agree to perform community service. 
 
Community service in England requires that the accused consent to the making of the 
order140.  South African law imposes no similar condition, though in practice the accused is 
likely to agree to the making of the order, particularly if he faces a term of imprisonment in the 
alternative.  Certainly it seems logical to assume that an offender is more likely to succesfully 
complete a sentence to which he consents, rather than one imposed against his will. 
 
(12) The envisaged task must be morally justifiable in its relation to the 
circumstances of the offence. 
By this it is apparently meant that the service which the accused completes must not be 
                                                                
   138 In that such reactions appeal more to people’s emotions than their sensibilities. 
   139 R. Schweitzer, `Towards a community approach in criminal management’, 3 SACC/SASK (1979), p. 238 at 239 
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overly harsh or lenient, given the particular nature of his crime.  This is also connected with the 
"principle" of the ‘link’, discussed earlier.  Both the punitive and rehabilitative nature of the 
sentence should reflect the severity of the offence. 
 
(13) The offender must not be given potentially dangerous duties such as with a 
fire-fighting unit or rescue service141. 
 
(14) The service must not be in conflict with the person’s religious beliefs and 
practices. 
 
(15) The initiative for the imposition of a community service order should come 
from the magistrate, but the prosecutor, defence counsel or the accused 
himself can ask that a CSO be imposed. 
 
(16) If the magistrate is of the opinion that community service is appropriate he 
must ask for a probation officer’s report142, who should be made aware of 
what the court has in mind so as to facilitate the proper placement of the 
accused. 
 
(17) Courts should approach the whole issue of community service selectively and 
with care. 
The danger of non-compliance is a considerable, potential problem with CSO’s, and it is 
for this reason that, as far as practicable, there should be agreement on the part of the offender, 
the person who is due to supervise him and, naturally, the court, of the conditions of the CSO.  In 
the same vein, it is important that the accused is of use and not a burden, that the CSO will not 
put him (or anyone else) in a position of danger and that it is not in conflict with his religious 
beliefs.  The agreement factor is possibly the strongest element, and may well determine whether 
or not a CSO will be succesfully carried out.  As mentioned earlier, one is arguably far more 
                                                                
   140 s.2(3) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. 
   141 In addition to the obvious need for avoiding danger to those he "serves", the offender must not be in physical danger 
himself.  For further reading on the liability for injuries to offenders sentenced to community service see (1981) 30 Buffalo 
Law Review, pp 387-404. 
   142 Pre-sentence reports are discussed later. 
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likely to carry out something to which they have agreed143, and so it should be not only desirable, 
but a necessary prerequisite, as in England, that the offender agree to the terms of the CSO. 
 
Pre-Sentence Reports 
The pre-sentence report is of paramount importance144, since it is usually the only piece 
of objective evidence by which a judge decides which type of sentence is appropriate.  Pickering, 
J. expressed that: 
 
The very purpose of obtaining a probation officer’s report would be to enable the court to 
be placed in a position to consider properly the appropriateness or otherwise of a 
community service order and the terms of such order.145 
 
He observed that there was a serious shortage of social welfare officers in Transkei, with even 
fewer of those who would be qualified to prepare a probation officer’s report.  But, he offered, 
magistrates should not be ‘hamstrung’ by these administrative difficulties and should use the best 
resources that are available. 
 
The success or failure of a community service order will undoubtedly depend on the 
extent to which it has been conceived and organised146.  These guidelines go a long way towards 
setting down a "policy" for the use of community service which is likely to develop as the CSO 
is recognised as a valuable sentencing option by government, the judiciary and the community.  
Organisations such as NICRO will play a pivotal role in co-ordinating all these interests and in 
developing viable programmes.  Consequently, these guidelines are of as much importance to 
them as they are to magistrates, perhaps even more so. 
 
VII. SOUTH AFRICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
Other cases in South Africa have attempted to address the issue of community service, 
though the law in this area has unfortunately evolved in a rather "piecemeal" fashion, with little 
                     
   143  The case of S v. Miners, 1992 (2) SACR 359, held that an accused who was aggressive and unwilling to co-operate 
with the probation officer was not suitable for community service. 
   144 R. Graser, `The Pre-Sentence Investigation as an Aid to Rational Sentencing, op cit. fn 131, greatly stresses the need 
for pre-sentence investigation, the `logical first step’, as he calls it. 
   145 S v. Sikunyana, Ibid., p. 211 
   146  For more on the organisation of community service programmes, see Antonia Tzannetakis, Community Service: An 
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indication of a general consensus on the value and applicability of CSOs.  Nevertheless, it is 
important to consider what has developed. 
The case of R v. Khumalo147, also referred to by Pickering, J. in Sikunyana, was the first 
to attempt to deal with the matter of the suitability of community service.  The accused, a 
policeman charged with culpable homicide, was found to be suitable for the imposition of a 
CSO.  The case was helpful in that it recognised not only the ‘serious disadvantages which 
necessarily flow from imprisonment’ but also that ‘the feelings of the community should be 
adequately reflected in the sentence of the Court’.  The decision to impose a CSO, taken by 
Goldstone, J. (as he then was), noted that it was important that the service the accused was to 
perform was of benefit to both the offender and the community.  He noted four reasons why ‘the 
community would undobtedly view (CSO) with favour’.  They are worth repeating. 
 
a) the offender is kept out of prison, and is thus able to continue to be a productive 
and useful member of society, and also avoid exposure to the negative 
consequences of imprisonment; 
 
b) the offender is able to continue to support his dependants, and so prevent them 
becoming a drain on more remote members of their family, their friends or the 
State; furthermore, the family unit remains intact; 
 
 
c) the fact that the offender is to render a community service free of charge during 
his own free time satisfies society’s justifiable demand that an offender be 
punished; and 
 
d) the community benefits directly from the work to be performed by the offender. 
(emphasis added) 
 
Although impressive, these reasons amount more to judicial recognition of the value of 
community service as a penal option, rather than practical guidelines.  But for the recognition 
                                                                
Organisational Approach, PhD Thesis (unpublished), London School of Economics, London University, 1992. 
   147 1984 (4) SA 642 
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alone, it is an important decision.  It is discouraging that subsequent cases have not been so 
helpful, and have to an extent eroded the impact of Khumalo. 
In S v. Abrahams148, a case involving public order, the court held that community service 
was appropriate for certain, more serious offences, provided the offender ‘is suitable therefor’.  
However, Conradie, J. then went on to say that ‘the regional magistrate had over-emphasised the 
seriousness of the offence’, which significantly diluted the court’s original argument. 
Conradie, J. was of the view that imprisonment was only of use where the community has 
to be protected, where the offender had a ‘personality disturbance’ or because of his particular 
characteristics was not suitable for non-custodial punishment.  With respect to serious offenders, 
he said, 
 
our courts should utilise imprisonment as a means of punishment only if the offence is so 
serious that non-custodial punishment would bring the system of criminal justice into 
discredit in the community149. 
 
The case centred around an 18-year-old student convicted of a public order offence for which he 
was harshly sentenced for 2 years, with one year partially suspended for 5 years.  Public Order 
offences in South Africa were viewed by the government as particularly serious, far in excess of 
ordinary crimes150, and so should be seen as unique.  The judge gave little general guidance as to 
when a community service order would be appropriate, and was concerned more with excusing 
the accused’s conduct rather than giving directions. 
Other cases have tried to expand upon when a CSO would be inappropriate, namely 
where a fine would otherwise have been imposed151 or where the accused was found guilty of 
fraud involving several million Rand152, but the approach has been very much "ad hoc".  In S v. 
De Bruin153, Khumalo was distinguished, the reason being that Khumalo was a first offender, 
whereas De Bruin had previous convictions.  Furthermore, the present offences of culpable 
homicide, reckless or negligent driving and driving under intoxication, were so extreme as to 
render community service undesirable. 
                     
   148 1989 (1) SASV 172 (K) 
   149 Ibid. 
   150 It was the student boycotts and other forms of public demonstration which eventually led to a state of emergency being 
declared on a number of different occasions. 
   151 S v. Van Der Westhuizen 1990 (1) SACR 531 
   152 R v. Guntenhoner 1990 (1) SACR 642 
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As much as one might agree with the result, it might have been more helpful to critically 
consider why this particular accused was not suitable, rather than simply refer to the fact that the 
crime was serious.  The sentence was nothing more than retributive punishment.  Deterrence was 
not really an issue since the accused had been convicted several times previously for similar 
offences.  To say that one offence or another renders an accused unsuitable misses the point and 
leaves the sentencer with as much discretion, and no real guidance.  The question that should be 
asked is whether the family of the victims, and indeed society generally, would be best served by 
the offender serving a 3 year sentence of imprisonment, of which he is likely to serve far less.  It 
certainly appeals to one’s sentiments that such horrific crimes be severely punished, but whether 
it offers society any greater protection or benefit is questionable. 
Gordon, AJ stated in S v. De Bruin that the question of sentence is for the court to 
determine, and rightly so, provided the court can be objective in the matter.  To his credit, he did 
remark that he would like to see community service imposed where possible, in preference to a 
term of imprisonment, referring to ‘supermarket thefts’, where ‘heavy fines and/or imprisonment 
(were) imposed on impecunious women’, but that there needed to be an increase in ‘the number 
and scope of suitable non-profit organisations’154. 
The decision in S v. Van Vuuren155 diminished the importance of retribution as a 
justification for punishment.  While still recognising that it was ‘one of the essential elements’, 
the judge felt that it ‘carried less weight’ where the accused compensated the victim, in which 
case community service is appropriate.  Encouragingly, the reasoning of the judge in this recent 
case compares favourably with the approaches of customary legal systems, which prefer more 
restorative measures over retributive sanctions156, but such decisions are rare. 
Finally, the courts have considered whether community service should be limited to first 
offenders.  In S v. Brown157, the court held that, since previous sentences ‘had not brought (the 
offender) to his senses’, community service was not considered to be desirable.  This decision 
directly conflicts with S v. Mogara158, in which it was held that ‘community service orders were 
not restricted to first offenders’.  Clearly it will be some time before the CSO is widely accepted 
as a credible penal option and judges more often address the use of it, rather than simply argue its 
                                                                
   153 1991 (2) SACR 158 
   154 Ibid., p.162 
   155 1991 (1) SACR 127 
   156 See supra. 
   157 1992 (1) SACR 571 
   158 1990 (2) SACR 9 
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value in the abstract. 
It could be said that the idea behind community service, from a penological perspective, 
is that offenders be deprived of their liberty, but not to the extent that it renders them incapable 
of appreciating their actions.  To go some way towards achieving this, and to make some effort 
in convincing the community that such a programme is of direct benefit to them, probation 
officers and the like should ensure that, in every sense, the work the offender carries out is 
useful159.  The CSO should benefit the community (and hopefully, ultimately, the offender as 
well) in counter-action to the way in which his crime was a detriment to the community. 
Community service necessarily implies an individualistic approach to sentencing, the 
consequences of which often result in a barrage of criticisms about sentencing disparity160.  To 
the extent that this disparity discloses obvious prejudice and/or lack of objectivity, sentencers can 
(and should) justly be held to account, but where disparity reveals nothing more than differences 
in the particularities or abilities of offenders or the limitations of a programme, community 
service must be seen as a "flexible" option. 
As the legal system in South Africa re-adjusts to greater accomodate the needs and 
desires of the community, customary law must receive greater recognition as part of ‘South 
African Law’161.  Community service fits more favourably with customary legal principles than 
do the repressive measures taken by colonialists in the past.  If the law with respect to 
community service orders develops in this way, as it should, then the further integration of 
customary law will prove inevitable. 
Equally, as the following section will illustrate, the courts are more likely to be effective, 
and a "barometer" of community attitudes if more efforts are made to ascertain their views.  A 
failure to do so ignores some of the most fundamental tenets of customary law and continues to 
put the criminal justice system in danger of ‘foundering without legitimacy’162. 
 
VIII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JUDICIAL AND COMMUNITY 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS COMMUNITY SERVICE ORDERS 
A significant objective of the community service order is to "reintroduce" a convicted 
                     
   159 N.B. The guideline in S v. Sikunyana that the accused be `of use and not a burden’. 
   160 Various newspaper articles in the UK have described sentences as a `lottery’, with disparity widest for less serious 
offences. 
   161 A. Sachs, Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa, O.U.P., 1990, pp. 90-103 
   162 Burman and Scharf, `Creating People’s Justice: Street Committees and People’s Courts in a South African City’, 
(1990) 24 Law & Soc. Rev. 693 at 738 
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criminal back into society, and so the current attitudes of the community are, naturally, of some 
relevance.  How will people feel about the prospect of a convict being set "free" into the 
community?  In particular, will they be supportive of such a person, or will the stigma of an 
offender’s crime leave them hopelessly alienated from the community, rendering them more 
likely to reconvict?  And, most importantly, will society’s arguably justifiable desire for 
retribution be satisfied by what many may see as a lenient sentence? 
The attitude of the judiciary is also of importance since it is them, after all, who will be 
deciding how the offender is to be best dealt with.  It is necessary to consider whether judges and 
magistrates will be supportive of such a comparatively radical option, given their tendency to 
impose sentences of a retributory nature163. 
As with all public figures, the judiciary is prone to criticism; it is particularly focused 
with regard to sentencing patterns.  In England, the argument that "individualised justice" 
demands an ‘unfettered’ judiciary is often diluted by highly publicised instances where society 
cries out over a sentence which is seen to be either too harsh or too lenient164.  In South Africa, 
there has been a high level of disparity in sentencing, with white offenders receiving relatively 
"soft" sentences for serious offences165 and non-white offenders receiving severe sentences for 
relatively minor offences, particularly if the case was of a political nature166.  In addition, many 
offenders have ended up in prison because they could not afford to pay the fine (even if only 100 
Rand = £20!).  For these reasons, and many others, many South Africans have been left with the 
feeling that there are ‘two systems of justice’167. 
Judges and magistrates should be aware of what society demands.  This is of special 
                     
   163 This is particularly true in a region such as the Transkei where magistrates are generally unaware (because of 
insufficient training) or unable (because of the general trend of criminal legislation to impose minimum sentences) to 
consider alternative sentences. 
   164 These criticisms have led to calls in England for greater legislative control over judicial decision making, which has in 
turn provoked criticisms that such moves threaten judicial independence and may in fact be unconstitutional.  Discussed 
generally on pages 99-114 in Harding and Koffman, Sentencing and The Penal System, Sweet and Maxwell, 1988. 
   165 There was a highly publicised case recently, where a farmer who murdered one of his labourers over the allegedly 
`intentional’ death of his dog, received only a suspended sentence, a fine and an order of compensation to the victim’s 
widow of a relatively small sum in monthly `maintenance’. 
   166 J. Jackson, Justice in South Africa, Secker & Warburg, 1980, wrote about a youth in Port Elizabeth who, on his first 
offence, was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment for throwing a rock at a police vehicle, causing negligible damage.  
Long sentences are not unusual in the Transkei today.  Based on the experiences of local lawyers in Umtata, a first offender 
found guilty of car theft can realistically expect a 3 year prison sentence.  A crime said to be politically motivated can still 
result in a disproportionately harsh sentence, as in a recent case in Transkei (citation unknown), where certain ex-civil 
servant workers connected with the previous administration were sentenced to an average of 16 years imprisonment for 
minor cases of fraud. 
   167 J. Jackson, Ibid., strongly criticised the South African criminal justice system, based on his many years of legal 
practice in Port Elizabeth.  He argued against the notion that South Africa’s judiciary was independent, but rather heavily 
weighted in favour of white interests and Afrikaaner nationalist ideology, with the few rights given to the non-white 
majority 
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importance in a country such as South Africa which lacks a jury system to decide a person’s 
guilt.  The judiciary are almost invariably selected from amongst the privileged sector of society, 
with the result that the balance of justice in South Africa rarely favours the "dispossessed". 
In a relatively recent attempt to alleviate this imbalance, defence counsel in the case of R 
v. Khumalo and 25 Others168 commissioned an empirical study of community attitudes to 
sentencing169.  They found that the majority of the people in Paballelo (the community in which 
the crime took place) were in favour of releasing the defendants, with only ‘2% expressing 
strong reservation against release’.  They cited the most common reason for this as being 
‘empathy for the (defendants) and their families’, with the second most common reason being 
that the defendants ‘had already been punished sufficiently’170.  Surprisingly, the authors of the 
study further went on to say that ‘this community would have been prepared to have the accused 
back in their midst, to serve sentences of community service’ (my emphasis). 
The response of the judge, that the study was the ‘opinion of a bunch of faceless and 
uninformed people’171, was frustrating.  It was especially so, given that the very same judge 
eventually did sentence some of the offenders to community service.  The authors of the study 
were particularly dismayed at the judge’s reasoning, which ‘regarded the evidence on the 
opinions of the community to be inherently irrelevant’, rather than unreliable, etc.172 
The South African Journal of Criminology in 1985 referred to the community service 
order as ‘potentially the most positive penological measure of this century -- for both the 
offender and the community’(sic)173.  The judiciary has been fairly slow to respond to this "call 
for action", though apparently it has become ‘reasonably well established in Capetown and 
Wynberg’174.  Indeed, NICRO175 in Capetown recently established an office in Umtata, with a 
view to ultimately provide support for a programme of community service in the Transkei. 
It appears that judicial opinion in the region is swinging in favour of community 
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   168 S v. Khumalo & 25 Others (1989) -- Unreported, though discussed in Hansson and Fine, `Expert testimony on 
community attitudes to sentencing:  The case of the Upington 26, Towards Justice?  Crime and State Control in South 
Africa, Hansson and Van Zyl Smit, 1990, O.U.P., p. 173. 
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     170 Ibid., p. 187. 
   171 Ibid., p.191. 
   172 Ibid., p.192. 
   173 Editorial, 9 SACC/SASK 1985, p. 211. 
   174 Reid, 8 SACC/SASK 1984, p.130. 
   175 National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Rehabilitation of Offenders. 
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service176.  But the spread of judicial awareness is thin, particularly amongst magistrates who are 
responsible for handling the majority of criminal offences.  Futhermore, organisations like 
NICRO are seriously underfunded, and able to cater for only a limited number of offenders.   
Despite certain judges’ insistence that the views of the community in the passing of a 
CSO are insignificant177, many jurists seem to be of the opinion that this is not so.  Indeed, 
‘community approval’ is said by some to be ‘crucial to the long term survival of community 
service’178.  In view of this, one might turn back to the study prepared by the University of 
Capetown in the case of Khumalo and 25 Others, which is clearly of the view that society is far 
less retributive than many judges would care to realise.  However, as the authors of the study 
rightly pointed out, ‘the aim of . . . the study . . . was to provide evidence on attitudes to 
sentencing . . . for a particular court case’(sic).  A "scaled down" version might be a pre-
sentence report, where the judge is provided with a report prepared by a probation officer listing 
the characteristics of the accused and whether, in his/her opinion, the accused is suitable for 
community service.  Such a report could take account not only of the offender’s circumstances, 
but of the community’s as well, since a specific programme must be available to him.  This can 
and should be included in these reports. 
In a region such as the Transkei, which has never in its history had a programme of 
community service, society must be assured that such a programme will be of benefit to them.  
They must appreciate that they are not only being consulted, but being compensated, and that the 
defendant is being punished for the harm he has caused.  Furthermore, organisations, whether 
they be independent NGOs, government programmes or businesses, must be convinced that they 
too will be helping to provide both the offender and the community a valuable service. 
In the limited period of time I spent in the Transkei, it became apparent that what the 
majority of the community desired was better education, cheaper food, more accessible health 
care179, adequate legal services, more jobs, fair and equal treatment by the local police180, better 
transport, telephones181, etc.  The authors of the Paballelo study had similar views, remarking 
that the ‘residents had been concerned about a number of community issues, the most important 
                     
   176  S v. Sikunyana, supra 
   177 Judge in Khumalo and 25 others, Ibid. 
   178 A ST Q Skeen, `Community Service Orders’, SACJ (1988) 2 SAS, p. 206 at p. 210. 
   179 A medical doctor working in the Transkei remarked about the marked lack of resources and suitable expertise.  See fn 
27. 
   180 The police in Umtata are reluctant to respond to crimes which are reported in the poorer districts, especially the 
township area. 
   181 The Transkei phone exchange, publicly controlled, is unreliable and very expensive.  People claim it is necessary to 
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of these being high rentals, many evictions, no electricity, streetlighting or tarred roads, poor 
medical services, high rates of unemployment, and abuse by the municipal police’182. 
As discussed, customary law suggests that the community places a higher value on 
compensation than on retribution.  It appears that what communities desire is not to punish 
people for "responding" to what many people see as a manifestly unjust system, but to generally 
improve their standard of living.  Put another way, their anxiety over whether they will be able to 
put food on the table significantly outweighs their concern over whether someone will be 
punished for stealing a packet of cigarettes.  Equally, it appears that most people would prefer to 
see schools and hospitals which were better equipped, rather than prisons which were bigger and 
more secure. 
It is fallacious for judges and legislators to make the assumption that people desire law 
and order over all other considerations.  On the other hand, it would be wrong to assume that 
people necessarily want to see offenders released back into society without any sort of 
punishment at all.  It seems that communities would view favourably a properly funded and well-
managed programme of community sentencing, especially if they were seen to be directly 
benefitting. 
In addition to ‘community approval’, local organisations will be one of the primary 
factors in determining the success of a community service programme.  One might expect that 
organisations would feel uncomfortable about the prospect of taking another person on board 
with their limited resources, particularly if that person was a convicted criminal.  But upon 
speaking with one of the larger, independent organisations in the region, I formed the view that, 
after some initial reluctance, people were willing to support such a programme.  However, there 
were certain logistical concerns.  These included:  how the individual was to be transported to his 
place of service, whether he would be adequately trained and, interestingly, whether he would be 
paid.  This latter concern arose out of a certain Dutch manager’s conviction that if someone was 
to do work for him, irrespective of whether or not he was carrying out that work at the instruction 
of a court, then that person should receive at least some form of remuneration.  He did not seem 
averse to the idea of payment being made to a sort of ‘trust fund’ to benefit the offender’s family 
members and to cover the costs of the programme, but his firm view was that there should be 
some form of payment. 
                                                                
"bribe" officials in order to gain access to an extra line. 
   182 Hansson and Fine, Ibid, p. 175. 
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A legal system which a large number of South Africans do not understand, much less 
respect, has to a considerable extent lost its credibility.  The judiciary cannot continue refusing to 
consider the interests of those they judge simply by referring to principles of "judicial 
independence", particularly if, as Jackson and others suggest, such a concept exists only in 
theory.  As with legislators, judges too need to be made accountable to the needs of the 
community.  As Hansson and Fine put it, 
 
In a future South Africa, it will be necessary for judges to be far more sensitive to the 
needs and fears of all sectors of the community183. 
 
IX. COMMUNITY SERVICE AS A MEANS OF "REVERSAL" 
It is evident that a major objective of the South African criminal justice system and 
corresponding laws of the past has been not to reform (or deter) the criminal and protect society, 
but to control the labour force and protect the market.  Despite South Africa’s previously high 
rate of economic growth, the governments’ policies, including that of ‘separate development’, 
have ideologically and economically split the population in two.  They effectively created "two 
economies" which inevitably merged, and shattered the economy as a whole.  They have sent the 
value of the country’s currency into rapid decline and left an infrastructure which is impressive 
in some areas of the country, but totally inadequate in others.  In short, colonialism in South 
Africa not only destroyed what had for generations been perfectly sustainable practices, it 
created a society which was at best contrived, at worst anomic. 
The only way in which this destructive trend, of labour control and the use of criminal 
sanctions as a means of coercion, will be reversed is through comprehensive economic and legal 
reform.  Urgency needs to be coupled with sufficient guarantees that people’s legitimate rights to 
personal and economic development will be met184.  But if the crime rate in South Africa 
continues to spiral, there will be little left of the country to reform or preserve. 
The widespread use of community service could be a significant step towards dragging 
the country out of its seemingly intractable problems.  Firstly, it is very much in the vein of 
"empowerment", which has the potential to transfer power back into the hands of the powerless 
(i.e. the community) and enables them to take control over certain affairs in order to provide for a 
                     
   183 Hansson and Fine, Ibid., p. 193 
   184 See generally, Albie Sachs, op cit. fn 161 
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more egalitarian and sustainable society.  Secondly, rather than shifting blame onto an individual 
offender, it serves to identify where the system is deficient, without detracting from the need to 
stress condemnation of the use of crime as the way out of one’s problems.  In this sense, it 
concentrates heavily on identifying and addressing the "root causes" of crime (i.e. poverty, 
unemployment, lack of education, lack of recreation, etc.) rather than merely looking to condemn 
or condone behaviour.  Most importantly, community service recognises that people are human 
beings, rather than simply part of a ‘labour force’. 
Community service could also go a long way towards reducing some of the more 
regressive and destructive elements within the present criminal justice system.  The horrific 
prison conditions and the terrible effects which incarceration has on the family and the economy 
would be addressed by the use of CSOs.  It "re-connects" the community with the administration 
of justice, something which has been lost through the forced adoption of European approaches to 
criminal justice. 
In addition to a concentrated effort at redistributing the country’s wealth must come 
social awareness and solidarity, that problems within the country cannot be observed at a 
distance, but must be seen as "everybody’s problem".  Hopefully this will lead to a collective 
response, rather than a continuation of the "reactionary" politics of calling for more law and 
order, bigger and stronger prisons, disciplined labour camps, etc.  Most communities in South 
Africa have suffered in one way or another under the shadow of apartheid.  By creating 
community answers, therefore, one is going right to the heart of the matter. 
 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
It is ironic that a region in which community service has never existed should produce 
what is arguably the most comprehensive South African decision on this subject.  It is hoped that 
the case of S v. Sikunyana185 will have a significant impact on the judiciary in Transkei and the 
rest of South Africa.  It represents firm judicial recognition of the benefits which community 
service has to offer a region such as the Transkei and gives ‘legal ammunition’ to any activist 
seeking to press forward reforms of this kind.  But it is also practical, and with ultimate 
responsibility lying with magistrates (many of whom are unaware that such a provision even 
exists), the need for such guidance is vital. 
In Transkei, political developments have been slow, given the intensely bureaucratic 
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nature of the region’s government.  Following the recent restructuring of South Africa and the 
reincorporation of the ‘homelands’, many of the country’s public services, including the prison 
service, welfare, health and education, are likely to be centralised.  This should provide for far 
more accountability and significantly less bureaucracy.  In September 1993 there was some 
indication that the Department of Welfare in the Transkei government was interested in working 
with NICRO to assist the development of a community service programme.  Following the recent 
political developments, there is likely to be even more support as the Region develops further186. 
Given that the logistical support for community service is at best in a fledgling state, 
there is likely to be a great deal of discussion as to what should be contained in such a 
programme.  As we have seen, South Africa’s past approaches to crime have not only been 
unsuccesful, but have resulted in an oppressive system of criminal justice which has in many 
people’s eyes lost its legitimacy.  Community services helps to "reverse" this trend, not only as a 
development initiative aimed at empowerment, but to the extent that it diverts prisoners from 
custody. 
The understandable scepticism that people have about community service has much to do 
with society’s and politicians’ misconceptions.  Community service is not a soft option, nor is it 
solely meant to rehabilitate offenders.  Furthermore, it cannot really be said to be without a 
punitive element, nor does it ignore what are centuries-old traditions of restitution and 
compensation187.  Being in large part a welfare initiative, it recognises that people are in trouble, 
and not just "in trouble with the law".  Its biggest virtue is its flexible nature, not only from the 
point of view of the offender, but from that of society as well.  It seeks to address concerns on all 
sides, and aims to dispel the notion that wrongdoers must simply be punished. 
Leila Patel puts forward an impressive model for the future of welfare in South Africa188 
which shares much of the objectives of community service.  She argues for: 
 
a developmental approach, which . . . places people at the centre of the development 
process, discards paternalism, and enhances individual and collective empowerment with 
                                                                
   185 Supra. 
   186 For further discussion on the reincorporation of Transkei into the Republic of South Africa, see A. Donaldson, J. Segar 
and R. Southall, Undoing Independence: Regionalism and the Reincorporation of Transkei into South Africa, Rhodes 
University, Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1992. 
   187 Junod, (1966) East African Law Journal 31, asserts that the necessary approach is one of `restitution in kind through an 
overhauled penal system in which institutions become productive’. 
   188 Leila Patel, Restructuring Social Welfare:  Options for South Africa, Ravan Press, 1992 
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the goal of achieving fundamental social transformation189. 
 
Her proposal is by its very nature ‘community based’, and essentially "legitimises" the 
programmes which arose out of the protests of many South Africans against what was a 
manifestly discriminatory and totally inequitable state welfare system190.  In the words of an ex-
detainee: 
 
In the struggle it is important to have services like this. . . These people (of progressive 
grass roots services) are in the struggle. . . When I come here, it makes me think they 
care about me.191 
 
Already Mandela, the new State President, has laid down the government’s proposals for 
the rebuilding of infrastructure and the redistribution of land through a Land Claims Tribunal.  
With such tremendous human and natural resources, one expects to see more changes, and far 
more quickly than many people are presently able to comprehend.  The inclusion of community 
service in these reforms could play a major role, not only in helping to rebuild the country, but in 
returning to the communities their legitimate need for self-empowerment. 
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   189 Ibid., p. 146. 
   190 She cites the example of family allowances, for which only white families were eligible. 
   191 Ibid., p.61  
